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In early November, the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies ratified a new extradition treaty with the
US, which had first been signed in 1995. With the treaty and other efforts to meet US standards
for cooperation in its war on drugs, Bolivia hopes to keep US aid flowing. As part of the Bolivian
government's ongoing efforts to placate the US, Interior Minister Carlos Sanchez Berzain went to
Washington in September and met with Gen. Barry P. McCaffrey, US President Bill Clinton's new
drug czar.
Sanchez Berzain said he was encouraged that Bolivia's efforts are paying off. "Gen. McCaffrey
believes that the relationship between the US and Bolivia is basically founded on support for
democracy," said Sanchez Berzain. He added that, although the anti-drug war "is one way to sustain
democracy," the US "wants to move beyond a bilateral relationship based solely on the fight against
drug trafficking."
Meanwhile, the US continued to pressure the Bolivian government to complete the ratification. The
treaty was approved in January 1995 by the Bolivian Senate and the following February by the US
Congress. Ratification by the Chamber of Deputies, then, was the last hurdle to put the treaty into
effect. In late October, Bolivia's Minister of Justice, Rene Blattman, urged the legislature to move on
ratification to fulfill US State Department requirements and goals.
On Nov. 6, the Chamber ratified the treaty, which will allow extradition of persons indicted in the
country making the request or persons who have been convicted or sentenced for crimes covered
in the agreement. Blattman also hoped that ratification would appease US Ambassador Curtis
Kamman, who said recently that Bolivian authorities were "not doing anything" to toughen the legal
sanctions for activities related to drug trafficking. "Ambassador Kamman is not inside our teams, he
does not know the work we are doing," said Blattman.
Even before ratification of the new treaty, requests for extraditions were processed by both Bolivia
and the US. Between March 1995 and October 1996, the US presented 17 requests for extradition to
the Bolivian Foreign Ministry, while Bolivia has requested the extradition of two Bolivians in the US.
Sanchez Berzain said one important case that could be affected by the new treaty is that of convicted
drug trafficker Luis Amado Pacheco Abraham, known as "Barbaschoca."
In September 1995, Peru intercepted a plane loaded with drugs at the Lima airport. An investigation
by both Peruvian and Bolivian authorities determined that Pacheco, a La Paz businessman,
was behind the drug shipment. He was convicted of drug trafficking and is in the Chonchocoro
maximum-security prison near La Paz (see NotiSur, 10/27/95). In mid-October, the Bolivian Foreign
Ministry announced that the US had requested Pacheco's extradition. Although at that time, the
new treaty had not yet been ratified, the Supreme Court of Justice began examining the request in
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light of the earlier extradition treaty, dating from 1900. The 1900 treaty was signed to facilitate the
extradition of legendary outlaws Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, who fled the US and were
later killed in Bolivia. Although drug trafficking was not covered in the 1900 treaty, it has provided
the legal justification for the extradition of four Bolivians on drug-related charges. However, last
September, the court denied the US request for the extradition of Federico Rios Irigoyen, another
accused drug trafficker, prompting renewed pressure to ratify the new treaty.
According to some analysts in Bolivia, Oscar Eid Franco, a leader of the Movimiento Izquierda
Revolucionaria (MIR) who was recently sentenced to four years in prison for protecting drug
traffickers, could become the first person extradited under the new treaty (see NotiSur, 02/03/95).
Eid Franco, who along with former president Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-1993) has led the MIR for 25
years, is not on the list of Bolivians for whom the US has requested extradition. However, the US
Embassy recently revoked his visa, which was seen as a possible step toward requesting extradition.
Saul Lara, a legal advisor at the Bolivian Foreign Ministry, said that "undoubtedly Eid Franco could
be subject to extradition."
Although Foreign Minister Antonio Aranibar, a leader of the Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL)
a breakaway group from the MIR believes that Eid Franco covered up drug traffickers, other
prominent Bolivians believe the conviction was purely political. MIR Dep. Hugo Carvajal said that it
is an open secret in Bolivia that the DEA was behind the charges against Eid Franco. The ratification
of the new treaty which the US has been pushing for more than a decade is only the latest effort by
Bolivia to comply with US demands, which comes in part because of threatened "decertification."
Each year on March 1, the US president must certify that certain countries are cooperating with the
US in its war on drugs, and decertification means a cutoff of aid.
Last year, the US denied certification to Colombia, an action that Bolivia seems determined to avoid
(see NotiSur, 03/08/96). In 1995, Bolivia one of the major producers of coca leaf, the main ingredient
used to manufacture cocaine was decertified, but received "a waiver" because of US "national
interests." Nevertheless, the action was taken as a warning that the US intended to get tough with
Latin American drug- producing nations (see NotiSur, 03/10/95). During the year, Bolivia eradicated
more than the 5,400 hectares of coca leaf as demanded by the US and signed the extradition treaty,
which then awaited ratification. Although critics increasingly question the effectiveness of US antinarcotics policies and the politicization of the whole certification process (see NotiSur, 02/09/96),
Sanchez de Lozada risked major political and social problems to comply with US demands.
The Sanchez de Lozada administration points out that the country received Clinton's certification
in 1996 because of its stepped-up efforts to stem the flow of cocaine northward through its energetic
and highly unpopular programs of crop eradication and substitution. Because of those efforts,
Sanchez de Lozada began his last year in power closer to achieving the goal set by the US for cocaleaf eradication than any of his predecessors. But many aspects of the eradication program are
strongly criticized, especially the use of herbicides that have detrimental human and environmental
consequences (see NotiSur, 04/28/95).
Nevertheless, according to the Bolivian government, in the first seven months of 1996, authorities
destroyed nearly 4,000 of the 5,000 ha of coca set by the US as the national minimum for eradication
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this year, and the government expects to complete eradication of 6,000 ha by the end of the year.
If the government meets its goal, by Dec. 31 the tropical Chapare region, the traditional coca and
cocaine-producing area in the center of the country, will have only 30,000 ha of coca plants left.
Regarding the second pillar of the its anti-drug trafficking policy, alternative development, the
Bolivian government says it is finally seeing some success, after 10 years of tough criticism for the
slight impact it has had.
In 1996, 54,000 ha of "alternative crops" pineapple, banana, palm hearts, and others were established
in the Chapare. According to reports from the alternative-development fund (Fondo Nacional de
Desarrollo Alternativo, FONADAL), Chapare campesinos are increasingly choosing to cultivate
alternative products, encouraged by an incentive of US$2,500 for every hectare of coca destroyed.
"Alternative development benefits communities that reduce coca growing and those that don't
produce it," said one FONADAL document. "Obviously, communities that do not reduce their coca
plantations will not be benefitted with any type of alternative-development project."
However, critics of the alternative-development program describe it as top-down, imposed by
outsiders with little understanding of the local situation, and counterproductive. While the program
pays campesinos for each hectare of land they voluntarily take out of coca production, that incentive
encourages poor campesinos to convert land to coca production so that they can then take it out of
production and collect the money. Now that Bolivia has ratified the extradition treaty and is fulfilling
the quota for crop eradication, all that remains is to pass legislation regarding money-laundering
to keep the flow of US and other international aid coming. [Sources: Inter Press Service, 03/08/96,
08/07/96; Cocapress (Bolivia), 10/09/96; Spanish news service EFE, 11/06/96; Agence France- Presse,
09/20/96, 10/14/96, 10/19/96, 11/06/96, 11/07/96]
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